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Abstract 
‘Philosophy with children’ is not only for children, can 
enable transformative experiences of thinking for 
participants of any age, and contributes something 
highly distinctive to the wider pedagogy of dialogue. 
This reflective paper offers a narrative account of the 
author’s practitioner research in communities of 
philosophical enquiry with children, where research is 
interpreted as phronesis. Illustrating the creation of 
critical incidents as a research approach, the enquiry is 
situated within the author’s working life as a university 
tutor in Education.  The author argues that her 
response is shaped by early experiences and 
expectations of philosophy, by the aesthetic quality of 
material chosen to prompt philosophical questioning 
and by the desire to mediate constraints of the given 
curriculum in schools and in university based teacher 
education. In this context, the paper suggests that 
picturebooks are philosophically inviting, with their 
complexity and ambiguity in content and form. Critical 
reflection on significant episodes in the enquiry 
remains open-ended, dwelling on memories of 
childhood and on literary, psycho-analytic and 
philosophical sources, exploring the significance of the 
metaphorical and symbolic in the realm of meaning 
and the part these can play in dialogue. The author 
claims that the community of enquiry pedagogy can 
free up the teaching and learning space and enable 
creative mediation of limitations in official curricula. 
Dialogue is experienced as a lenient and permissive 
space in which it becomes genuinely possible to ‘play’ 
with ideas.   
Introduction 
What can be learned about dialogue from philosophising 
with children? What might this teach us about dialogue 
in other settings, including the university? In my work as 
a tutor in the field of Education, the ‘university’ is 
necessarily outward-facing, a site of learning and 
scholarship extending well beyond the buildings in 
which it is housed. It involves teaching, consultancy, and 
research. I teach undergraduate and postgraduate 
students in Education Studies; trainee teachers; 
practising teachers engaged in short courses, Masters or 
Research degrees, and school students. I am curious 
about ways in which my philosophical background, my 
various roles and experiences as pedagogue, and the 
different contexts in which I practise as a university 
educator, are ‘in dialogue’ with one another. I am 
interested in pedagogy in the broadest sense of the 
word, whatever the educational setting and including 
higher education, and in the epistemological and ethical 
underpinnings of particular pedagogies. Drawing on my 
doctoral work (Haynes, 2007a), this paper discusses my 
practitioner research in the explicitly dialogical 
pedagogy of the community of philosophical enquiry,1 
(abbreviated throughout this paper as P4C
2
). It sets out 
                                                             
1 The pedagogy of the community of philosophical 
enquiry has been adopted in a wide range of formal and 
informal educational settings, with children, young 
people and adults alike. 
2
 P4C is an umbrella term widely used to describe the 
distinctive pedagogy of philosophising in a community of 
enquiry. Leading proponents in the UK have adopted the 
term Philosophy with Children, to reflect the idea of the 
teacher as a co-enquirer, engaged in dialogue with 
children (or with any group of participants) a mutually 
educative enquiry. In the UK, most practitioners draw on 
a wide range of material to prompt philosophical 
questioning and dialogue within a community of enquiry 
framework. The programme devised by Matthew 
Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp in the USA in the 




to illustrate the permissive and playful possibilities of 
philosophical dialogue: the aesthetic, intellectual and 
affective pull of that which is philosophically inviting; the 
element of surprise; the sense of freedom and collusion. 
The experiences related here have profoundly 
influenced my conception of ‘dialogue’ and its wider 
potential in the university. 
Whether ‘in role’ as philosopher, primary teacher, 
parent, or university tutor, I’ve been concerned with 
making creative ‘space’ for thinking, and with the 
inclusive, egalitarian values associated with critical and 
transformative education3. In working with the arguably 
‘transformative’ pedagogy of philosophy with children 
my preoccupation is with the ethics of everyday 
educational interaction. In ‘A Photographer’s Life’, Annie 
Leibowitz writes: ‘I don’t have two lives. This is one life, 
and the personal pictures and the assignment work are 
all part of it’ (2006:19). Likewise, I am conscious of the 
worlds and identities that I inhabit and how these 
combine to shape what becomes salient in my practice. 
This paper provides a taste of my philosophical work, 
the qualities of the dialogical space I associate with P4C 
and the methods I have adopted to engage with and to 
refine my wider practice as an educator. 
                                                                                        
1970’s, is known as Philosophy for Children. This 
programme, that reflects key ideas in Western 
philosophy, is based on a published sequence of novels, 
teacher manuals and the training programme for 
teachers based at the Institute for the Advancement of 
Philosophy for Children (IAPC), Montclair State 
University, the base of the North American network of 
P4C.  
3 Critical pedagogy is concerned with critiquing 
educational institutions and transforming both 
education and society (eg Freire, 1972; Giroux, 1988; 
Morrow and Torres, 2002, amongst many others). A 
critical pedagogy is one that seeks to redress social 
inequalities and challenge the prevailing social order and 
forms of discourse. It assumes that dominant groups in 
society tend to determine the dominant meanings 
attached to culture and that these are the meanings 
most commonly expressed through official curricula. 
I begin with an explanation of the practical philosophical 
orientation of my research and the critical incident 
paradigm. I give an account of my encounter with P4C 
(1994) and my perception that it provided a means to 
creatively mediate constraints on teaching experienced 
during that period in schools and in teacher education in 
the UK. This is followed by discussion of the aims of P4C 
and questions it provokes about constructs of 
philosophy and child. The final section reflects on my 
distinctive ‘take’ on P4C and my interpretation of the 
wider significance of critical episodes. I conclude with 
some thoughts about communities of philosophical 
enquiry, dialogue and the university. 
 
Educational research as practical philosophical 
enquiry 
 
My discussion of my practice incorporates the 
overlapping spheres in which I work as a university 
educator. In describing research as ‘thoughtful practice’ 
and drawing on Arendt’s (1968) notion of ‘thinking 
without banisters’ Nixon, Walker and Clough suggest 
that to become thoughtful is: 
to climb the stairs without the security 
of known categories; because for 
each, the other is different, and the 
challenge of the other unique. 
Thinking is a moral necessity, without 
which right action is unthinkable and 
the onward rush of events irreversible 
(in Sikes, Nixon and Carr, 2003:89). 
What initially motivated my research was my desire to 
remove obstacles to participation and strengthen 
children’s voices in philosophical enquiry. This enquiry 
set out to tap my experience in education and to put it 
to work to achieve further pedagogic refinement 
through practical judgment or phronesis. As Dunne 
(1997) explains: 
Phronesis is what enables experience 
to be self-correcting and to avoid 
settling into mere routine. If 
experience is an accumulated capital, 
we might say, then phronesis is this 




capital wisely invested (Dunne, 
1997:292). 
In his characterisation of the ‘life of practice’ Dunne 
adopts Wittgenstein’s metaphor of ‘rough ground’ to 
express the need for practitioner flexibility, 
responsiveness and improvisation on the one hand and 
the need for ‘rootedness’ on the other. Such rootedness 
is available through a practitioner’s history of 
participation in the community of practice itself, through 
‘grounding’ in its dispositions and the subtleties of its 
culture. Dunne cautions that this particular notion of a 
‘field of practice’ is questionable in a technique and 
target orientated world of education (1997:378). To live 
in the contemporary world of education is often to 
experience a kind of schizophrenia, to hear voices. As a 
university tutor working in the field of Education over 
the last twenty years these voices have been ever 
present. Creative mediation of external demands and 
constraints is an absolute necessity (Osborn in Croll, 
1996; Woods, 1995). 
 
It is possible to create a humane space in the school or 
university classroom and to hold on to the sense that 
practice, of both research and teaching, has an ‘open 
texture’ (Dunne, 1997:379). Rather than P4C being a 
method of teaching that I sought to apply and evaluate, 
its process is one that I internalised, a practical everyday 
philosophy. Griffiths (2003:21) argues that practical 
philosophy is ‘with and for’ rather than ‘about or applied 
to’ and it is one that acknowledges its origins in the 
concrete communities in which it operates and then 
seeks to speak ‘to something more universal, to 
something inclusive of, for instance, classroom teachers 
as well as academics, and young people as well as 
teachers’ (Griffiths and Cotton, 2005). Such a rationale 
suited my practitioner research in the context of 
working in the inter-related fields of a school in my 
neighbourhood, initial teacher education and continuing 
professional development. The research was embedded 
in my ongoing and local work as a university teacher in 
the field of Education. 
 
The significance of personal experience, of ‘rootedness’ 
(Dunne, 1997) and of ‘situational understanding’ (Elliott, 
2006) are expressed in feminist approaches to enquiry, 
which Greene and Griffiths (2003:77) characterise as 
‘less a theory – or a set of theories – and more a 
perspective, a lens, a handle on the world and its ideas, 
a way of acting and speaking’. For Greene and Griffiths, 
this perspective is held together by certain 
preoccupations, not necessarily exclusive to feminism, 
and ‘each philosopher marked by feminism makes her 
own trajectory’ (2003:75). My study was a piece of 
‘situated philosophy’ – it took its bearings from the 
guideposts of my lived experience, just as Greene and 
Griffiths argue ‘we cannot be the unmoved movers, or 
take the view from nowhere’ (2003:77).   
 
The marriage of personal and professional concerns and 
the situated outlook of the research are rooted in an 
orientation towards social justice (Griffiths, 1998; Sikes, 
Nixon and Carr, 2003) as well as in feminist perspectives 
in philosophy (Benhabib, 1992; Greene and Griffiths, 
2003). This integration expresses connections between 
passion, imagination and reason and between private 
and public domains, shaping my conceptions of 
‘listening’ and student ‘participation’ in philosophical 
dialogues. In my research these ethics were articulated 
through the exploration of significant moments of 
experience and through their narrative representation. 
Benhabib (1992) suggests that female experience tends 
historically to be attuned to the narrative structure of 
action and the standpoint of the concrete other or what 
she terms the art of the particular. My doctoral thesis 
drew on autobiographical material that had a bearing on 
my experience and understanding of child, on my efforts 
to provide children with opportunities to express their 
ideas, on the meanings I attached to episodes of 




classroom talk, on my interpretation of the pedagogy of 
philosophical dialogue (Haynes, 2007a).  
Critical episodes of practice in practitioner 
research 
Research begins from what catches our attention. A 
number of accounts are offered of those events that 
trigger an enquiry and alert the researcher to a 
‘something’ to be questioned. McNiff (1993) refers to 
moments when practitioners identify a concern through 
a felt gap, or contradiction, between values and action 
(McNiff 1993:33). Mason (2002) refers to these 
moments as ‘noticing’ and has distinguished ‘forms of 
noticing’ (2002:33) as well as practical processes for 
using these in a disciplined way to inform professional 
judgment. Tripp (1993) suggests that incidents in 
practice become significant when they strikingly appear 
as an example of a wider social category or dramatically 
contrast with previous experience. These events stand 
out and can become turning points in professional life. 
The moment of surprise, awareness or noting the 
distinctive character of such events is a first step, but for 
the episode to become critical it has to be interpreted 
and interrogated Tripp, (1993:25). The salience of events 
in practice may not become conscious at the time of 
their happening. Brown suggests that critical incidents 
are: 
memorable detritus found within the 
sediment of our lives…they include 
those moments which refuse to leave 
our consciousness or which make their 
impact by unexpectedly re-entering our 
thoughts after the event which was 
their genesis. Their usefulness to us are 
as pieces of grit around which we can 
attempt to form a pearl (1994:1). 
 
An incident becomes critical when it leads to increased 
sensitivity to values and to re-examination of implicit 
beliefs and theories. Tripp writes: 
critical incidents are not 'things' which 
exist independently of an observer and 
are awaiting discovery like gold nuggets 
or desert islands, but like all data, 
critical incidents are created. Incidents 
happen, but critical incidents are 
produced by the way we look at a 
situation: a critical incident is an 
interpretation of the significance of an 
event. (Tripp, 1996:8) 
Tripp (1993:97) argues that certain kinds of critical 
incident are more strongly directed towards 
biographical and political understanding. These are 
often emotionally charged and lead to searches into the 
autobiographical origin of values expressed in a 
particular response to a situation. Such critical episodes 
help to describe the relationship between a practitioner 
and the context in which s/he is working. Although not 
the only form of data collected, critical incidents during 
the three year period of practitioner research in a 
primary school formed the dynamic core of my enquiry. 
Such incidents were explored through dialogue with 
trainees, practising teachers and critical friends in the 
course of my everyday university work and this further 
informed their analysis, as did a wide range of literature 
in childhood, philosophy and education.  A series of such 
incidents taken together can constitute an auto-
ethnography and/or situated philosophy, as is the case 
with my doctoral thesis.  
 
Critical incidents may start life as anecdotes. An 
anecdote is a short narrative of a striking incident, 
associated with the oral tradition. Van Manen (1997) has 
written of the value of anecdotes in researching and 
writing about lived experience. Anecdotes form a 
counterweight to theoretical abstraction and are a 
valuable implement for uncovering meanings: 
‘anecdotes possess a certain pragmatic thrust. They 
force us to search out the relation between living and 
thinking, between situation and reflection’ (p119). 
Anecdotes have often enjoyed low status in scholarly 
work where empirical generalisation is the aim. Van 
Manen argues that the anecdote is valuable in a 




different way, a ‘poetic narrative’ that refers to a truth 
still difficult to articulate, perhaps symbolic and 
metaphoric, rather than literal in character (1997:116-
21).  
 
Anecdotes have an important function in some schools 
of philosophical research. They furnish the concreteness 
of lived experience and act as a levelling device. Van 
Manen claims: 
the paradoxical thing about anecdotal 
narrative is that it tells something 
particular while really addressing the 
general…and vice versa, at the hand of 
anecdote fundamental insights or 
truths are tested for their value in the 
contingent world of everyday 
experience (1997:120). 
Van Manen concludes that the significance and value of 
anecdotal narrative are situated in its power to compel, 
to lead to reflection, to involve us personally, to 
transform by being touched or moved and to measure 
one’s interpretive sense. The ‘validity’ of an anecdotal 
narrative is expressed through its persistence and 
through the extent to which it resonates with the 
experience of others.  
 
Wild Things: an anecdotal narrative of my first 
encounter with P4C 
My first awareness of philosophy as a distinctive sphere 
of experience came through immersion in the language, 
imagery and rituals of Catholicism and introduction to 
French literature and philosophy, whilst boarding at a 
Belgian convent school, between the ages of 9-14. Later, 
an English teacher’s passionate knowledge of his subject 
alerted me to the philosophical richness of fiction, 
poetry and drama, and to the possibility of ‘bringing 
meaning’ to narrative and linking narrative to 
philosophical ideas. These early experiences were 
formative. 
Similarly, I was introduced to philosophy with children 
through a workshop demonstrating an approach that 
took picture books as the context for opening enquiry, 
pioneered by the Dutch philosopher Karin Murris 
(1992)
4
. She had a baby boy with her at the time and her 
older daughter was there too, helping to care for the 
little one. I was struck by the presence of the baby and 
by the way Karin moved between leading the workshop 
and keeping an eye on him. I was taken with her warm, 
direct and humorous delivery and impressed by the 
thoughtful way she listened and responded to 
participants, such a refreshing contrast with modes of 
‘delivery’ most common in schools and teacher training 
at that time. The book chosen for our enquiry was 
Maurice Sendak’s widely acclaimed Where the Wild 
Things Are, first published in 1963.  
 
Sendak’s story opens with Max, a boy dressed in a wolf 
suit, chasing his dog with a fork raised, weapon-like, in 
his hand. We do not see Max’s mother, but read that 
she calls him ‘wild thing’ and he responds ‘I’ll eat you 
up’. Max gets sent to bed without his supper. In his 
room, a forest grows, an ocean appears. Max sails off to 
an island inhabited by ‘wild things’. They make him their 
king. There is a ‘wild rumpus’ led by Max until he 
becomes tired and longs for home. As with a number of 
this author’s works, this book explores the ground that 
becomes available to children in the absence of adult 
intrusion and supervision, a subject close to Sendak’s 
heart (Murris and Haynes 2000).  
 
‘What puzzles you in this story?’ Karin asked. Aroused by 
the question, ‘why do we sometimes want to eat the 
people we love?’, I thought about my children when 
very young, that I sometimes described their bodies as 
‘edible’; of occasionally having the urge to bite my 
                                                             
4 There is growing scholarly interest in picturebooks 
from literary perspectives. The philosophical value of 
picturebooks and their sometimes controversial nature 
is developed by Haynes and Murris in a forthcoming 
volume on picturebooks, pedagogy and philosophy to be 
published by Routledge Research in Education Series in 
2010. 




lover’s shoulder; of the way in which being in love, or 
losing one we love, can sometimes kill the appetite for 
food, or that another’s love can be all consuming. I 
contemplated the language that links love and desire 
with taste, ingestion or consumption. Through the 
thinking and dialogue that followed, I had a strong sense 
of recovering something lost from the educational 
domain. The comparison between the story and my felt 
sense of intrusion and supervision by external 
authorities in education is worth noting here. 
 
There were a number of ways to analyse this 
experience. I began by considering salient features in my 
recollection of this event, the emotions that it evoked 
and connections with my life and work at that time. 
What stood out were: 
 the presence of the baby;  
 desire and arousal, the playful overlap of 
appetites: for love, for food, for ideas;  
 the ambiguity of Sendak’s book  
 reclamation of something lost;  
 the sheer pleasure of philosophical perplexity; 
 the sense of freedom to respond.  
 
The presence of the baby and the connections made 
between eating and love appear to be linked. They 
allude to the roles of mother and lover that Karin 
seemed able to bring into the room with her, as well as 
to my own (lost) being-child. I had returned to full time 
work only four months after the birth of my second 
child. At this time he was four years old. My job as a 
university lecturer seemed remote from his world and 
my work as a teacher educator seemed remote from the 
world of primary schools and children.  The references 
to the rediscovery of something lost reflected these 
separations and absences in my university teaching at 
the time.  
 
It seems possible that I felt unable to address my values 
as an educator or to creatively access my childhood or 
motherhood in my university teaching, and Karin 
seemed to be suggesting a way to integrate these 
aspects of self, through her view of picturebooks, 
through the openness of the method of teaching, and 
through the way in which she was choosing to 
accommodate her mother and teacher selves. Nias 
(1984) has written of this wish to preserve beliefs and 
practices integral to ‘substantial selfhood’ as a common 
concern for teachers. The effect of the workshop was 
liberating for me. It reconnected me with my own 
children, with the value of the open questions children 
ask when very young, a kind of perplexity, playfulness 
and engagement that were absent from target 
orientated models of teaching in the ascendancy during 
this period and which were dominating the teacher 
education programmes in which I was involved. 
 
This event provided a much needed source of resistance 
during a time of growing concern about the limitations 
of the official curriculum of schools and in the field of 
teacher education. Like many of my fellow academic 
colleagues in Education, I felt imagination and creativity 
were being stifled by an over-prescriptive curriculum. 
Many teachers in schools felt that children’s 
opportunities to take the initiative and flexibility to 
pursue their interests had been seriously curtailed. By 
contrast, the use of picturebooks to stimulate open-
ended philosophical dialogue appeared to offer a means 
to enable children, trainees and teachers to think and 
speak for themselves. In a political climate in education 
experienced as repressive, being reintroduced to my 
philosophical self made a different kind of dialogue 
seem possible.  
 
Murris interprets philosophia as 'love for wisdom, when 
love includes desire: philosophy is a constant craving for 
food for thought …' (1992, Introduction Booklet:14). She 
argues that the picturebook is an excellent vehicle for 
philosophical thought, for children and adults alike. 
Illustrations and text awaken the sensory appetites. 




Picturebooks invite an intellectual and an emotional 
response. We were not asked to explore the meaning in 
the book but are offered it as a starting point for 
investigation, beginning with the meaning given from 
within our own experiences. It is easy to see how this 
rationale for Murris’s approach to teaching philosophy 
in school echoes the ways in which I had come to 
philosophy through literature, through sensual 
experience and through being treated as an 
independent meaning maker in the context of exploring 
works of literature. Examples of work with children 
referred to in the final section of this paper illustrate the 
significance of such narrative reference points, the 
playful and lenient space they open up, as well as the 
notion of ‘philosophically inviting’ material and its place 
in the creation of dialogue, which could have much 
wider pedagogical implications, if the principles of this 
approach was taken up by university tutors, for 
example. 
 
Philosophy with Children – Philosophy and Child 
 
Proponents of philosophy with children argue that its 
practice encourages reasonableness and initiates 
children into public discussion of morality and values, 
including democratic values (Fisher, 1998; Lipman 1991, 
1993; Splitter and Sharp, 1995). P4C brings to the 
surface deeper questions about constructs of ‘child’ and 
‘reasonableness’, the undemocratic nature of schools 
themselves, the reproductive nature of institutional 
discourses, routines and curricula and the uncertainty of 
any global project in a postmodern world (Haynes, 2002, 
2005; Haynes and Murris, 2007b; Kohan, 2002; 
Vansieleghem, 2005).  Practitioners variously emphasise 
the teaching of ‘thinking skills’, ‘emotional intelligence’ 
or ‘citizenship’ in the effort to make P4C ‘fit in’ with 
current preoccupations and policy agendas and to get it 
taken up in schools, arguably compromising its 
‘transformative’ potential.   
 
The suitability of philosophy for children has been 
challenged by those who argue that younger children 
are developmentally incapable of the type of abstract 
and de-centred reasoning that they believe is required in 
philosophy (Kitchener, 1990; White in Griffiths, 1992). 
Cross-cultural studies of play and its importance in 
children’s learning and health have led some to 
questioning the wisdom of an activity like philosophy 
with children as developmentally inappropriate (Fox, 
2001). These early discussions about whether or not 
children can do philosophy concerned the capacities of 
children to act like adult philosophers (Kitchener, 1990; 
White in Griffiths, 1992).  
 
When it comes to dialogues between adults and 
children, Brazilian philosopher Walter Kohan turns this 
argument about the construction of knowledge on its 
head:  
Children will build their own 
philosophies, in their own manner. 
We will not correct the exclusion of 
children’s philosophical voices by 
showing that they can think like 
adults; on the contrary, that would be 
yet another way of silencing them 
(Kohan, 1999:7). 
For such writers, if dialogue is to be transforming, it 
implies a re-examination of the nature of schools 
themselves and the goal of reasonableness in that social 
context, an investigation of what it means to teach for 
thinking and of the nature of thinking itself. They 
suggest that the inclusion of children (and arguably 
other previously unheard voices) in philosophical 
discussion is a critical action that alters the ground of 
philosophy and the process of education through 
philosophy. Kohan writes: 
One of the functions of philosophy is 
to problematise dominant orders of 
discourse, practice and interpretation 
... it is a form of social critique and a 
form of creativity proposing 
alternative (Kohan, 1999:2). 




Some supporters of P4C have argued that children can 
do philosophy by providing evidence of children’s 
interaction in classroom communities of enquiry and by 
proposing new paradigms of philosophical dialogue 
(Murris, 1997) and by re-framing the concept of 
philosophy  (Kennedy, 1999; Kohan, 1999) and the 
purposes and processes of education (Kohan, 2002). The 
theory and practice of philosophical enquiry with 
children continues to raise some fundamental questions 
about the nature of philosophy in the Western context 
and, in some cases, suggests a paradigmatic shift in our 
understanding of the creation of knowledge: 
The experience of the communal 
dialogue which is the grounding 
practice of CPI (Community of 
Philosophical Inquiry) brings us face to 
face with the original condition of 
philosophy, philosophy not just as 
conversation, but as an emergent, 
multi-vocal and interactive story 
about the world, and about persons 
thinking in the world (Kennedy, 1999). 
Kennedy argues that the oral nature of philosophical 
enquiry is crucial to its radical role. Children have 
traditionally been marginalised and their claims to 
knowledge and their ways of expressing their thinking 
devalued through a process that identifies them as 
outsiders. Paradoxically, from such a position, children 
have a great deal to contribute to the work of 
deconstruction and reconstruction that typifies 
philosophical thinking (Kennedy, 1999; Haynes, 2002, 
2007a). Such debates are of profound importance for 
scholars in the fields of philosophy, childhood and 
education. 
 
Rather than asking can children philosophise, can we 
teach thinking, what is a child, or what is childhood, my 
research is concerned with lived experiences of children 
I encounter, with the questions that emerge and the 
meanings they construct when thinking through P4C. I 
have explored and analysed the obstacles to, and 
conditions and opportunities for, listening to children 
(2002, 2007) such as controversies and taboos (Haynes, 
2005a; 2005b; Haynes and Murris, 2009) and the 
exploratory and playful dimensions of children’s 
philosophical thinking, including their willingness and 
capacity to operate in imaginative and metaphorical 
realms (Haynes and Murris, 2000; Haynes, 2007a; 
2007b). What P4C offers is the possibility of dialogue as 
a lenient (but not laissez-faire) space, and the notion of 
‘child’ understood as the philosophical disposition and 
character  upon which we can all draw, rather than as a 
fixed temporal phase of human development, as in 
‘childhood’.  
 
Moving Teddies and Talking Dogs 
 
In dialogue with younger persons, the subject matter 
includes both ‘serious’ questions arising from children’s 
lives as well as more light-hearted and adventurous 
enquiries. Whatever the topic of enquiry, children (as 
well as trainees and teachers) have commented 
favourably on the permissiveness of the space made 
possible in a community of enquiry (Haynes, 2007b). The 
use of picturebooks as starting points provides 
philosophically inviting opportunities to move into the 
ground opened up by binary opposites such as good and 
evil, bravery and cowardice, wealth and poverty, fame 
and obscurity, safety and danger. Fiction offers freedom 
of thought and imagination rarely taken up in ‘factual’ 
scenarios. Fairy tale and fantasy often provide valuable 
ground for metaphysical enquiries. Many works of 
children’s literature and TV programmes or games 
feature anthropomorphism and children often choose to 
explore questions about animals and about relationships 
between animals and human beings.  
 
In some of my earliest experiences of dialogue with 
young children, enquiries about the powers of teddies 
and toys were popular: how come teddies were often in 
different places to where they had been left? Could they 
move on their own? Did they do so in the dark, or when 
the door was closed and they were not being observed 




by humans? I noticed that it was often during such 
speculative moments that children became particularly 
absorbed and energetic. I learned that it was important 
not to intervene too literally or heavy-handedly but to 
try and respond with what Van Manen terms 
‘pedagogical tact’ (1991).  When I reported such 
dialogues to student teachers, some were 
uncomfortable and one student expressed strong 
concern about whether it was right for an adult to allow 
the children’s claims about the bears moving to be left 
unresolved. She said that children have to be told what 
is real. In talking to trainees or practising teachers about 
this or similar episodes, I often came across the view 
that young children are developmentally unable to 
distinguish fantasy from reality. Teacher ‘truth telling’ or 
‘naivety tolerating’ positions both seem to be at odds 
with the possibility of genuine dialogue with children. 
The capacity to suspend belief, adopt a stance of 
fallibility and listen attentively to children, are all crucial 
to the facilitating role in P4C: neither indulgent and 
sentimental, nor premature and silencing. Such 
classroom episodes provide rich material for trainees 
and teachers alike to explore their underlying 
epistemological beliefs as well as their constructs of 
child and view of their social role. Such dialogues 
contrast markedly with tutor led presentations on topics 
such as ‘children’s misconceptions’ or ‘how children 
learn’. 
 
Ideas about children’s thinking that surfaced with 
trainees or teachers heightened my awareness of 
assumptions often made in responding to children and 
alerted me to the sensitivity demanded by the 
facilitating role, if paying more than lip service to 
listening to children’s ideas. Reflection on critical 
moments enabled me to consider the ‘moves’ I had 
made and the extent to which they either opened up or 
closed down the dialogue. Happily, the children often 
ignored my questions and interventions and continued 
with the lines of enquiry that interested them. 
One such critical moment arose through children’s 
responses to John Brown, Rose and the Midnight Cat 
(Wagner, 1979). In this picturebook Rose is a widow who 
lives with her dog, John Brown. Life is uneventful until 
Rose spots a black cat and wants to let it in to the house. 
John Brown refuses and tells the cat to keep away. 
When Rose sees the cat she secretly gives it milk. While 
she is not looking, the dog tips the milk out of the bowl. 
This competition continues until Rose goes to bed one 
evening and does not get up the next day, saying she 
plans to stay there forever. John Brown lies there 
thinking, eventually asking Rose if the cat will make her 
better. She says it will and he lets the cat come into the 
house.  
 
In the dialogue that followed the children initially 
expressed surprise that John Brown was able to speak 
until one child suggested that dogs could be trained to 
talk. Others agreed that dogs could understand 
commands and express themselves by wagging their 
tails and so on. Others testified to dogs’ capacity to offer 
companionship, endorsing the dog’s role in the story. 
Amy took the discussion to another level when she 
reported that her dog Benj frequently spoke, and 
enjoyed saying rude things to her mum – she offered an 
example of one such occasion, repeating the words used 
by the dog and her mum. One or two children asked 
why the dog did not speak when outside the school 
gates and Amy explained that the dog was embarrassed.  
 
Amy's narrative captured the attention of the group and 
offered a way out of my mechanical handling of the 
dialogue. It conveyed meaning, but it was not obvious 
what this could be. The episode raised a number of 
questions about my role in these dialogues. How were 
the children using the space created by the story, and 
the invitation to question and explore, to express ideas 
about their experience? What kind of ‘truth’ is 
expressed in such narrative accounts? What are the 
possibilities created by such playful responses?  In 




reflecting on such episodes, I considered ways in which 
various disciplinary perspectives influential in Education 
would ‘read’ these events. I paid special attention to 
‘readings’ of such episodes that penetrate what Gaita 
(2004) refers to as ‘the realm of meaning’.  
 
Sources that informed my reflection also included 
memories from my childhood as well as other dog tales 
that made use of anthropomorphism.  As a small child I 
had a small teddy that was able to speak, thanks to my 
father. This bear was permitted to swear and be 
exceptionally rude and insulting, particularly to my 
father. In later years, family pets would also adopt this 
voice. Long after we, the children, had left home, I 
noticed that my father would use the pet cat as his 
'mediator'. Sometimes the cat would seem to be on my 
mother's side and could be heard slinging insults at my 
dad. Sometimes, he would use the cat to voice his 
grievances. I’ve noticed that the cats and dogs that live 
in my household have inherited this magical ability to 
speak.  
 
Winnicott (1971/1991) argues that the task of ‘reality-
acceptance’ is life-long and that all human beings carry 
the strain of relating inner and outer reality. He suggests 
that provision of an intermediate area of experience, in 
which the nature of reality is left unquestioned, provides 
relief from this strain. He sees this realm of illusion as 
being retained throughout life. It appears again in the 
intense experiencing that belongs to imaginative work 
and living, the arts, religion and creative activity in any 
subject. Transitional phenomena do not belong 
exclusively to early childhood, but are a recurring aspect 
of human experience, bound up with meaning making.  
Reference to the part played by the creative domain, in 
‘managing reality’, links with work on the significance of 
metaphor in the reasoning process itself. Corradi 
Fiumara (1995) explores metaphor as interaction 
between language and life, a process that bridges the 
segregated classes of body and mind and the 
accustomed distinctions of rational versus instinctual. 
She suggests: 
Through a metaphoric appreciation of 
language, knowledge is seen not so 
much as the task of ‘getting reality right’ 
but rather as the enterprise of 
developing linguistic habits for coping 
with whatever reality-in-the-making we 
may have to confront (1995:72). 
Following such arguments, Amy's story about her dog 
Benj can be interpreted as a poetic contribution to 
philosophical dialogue. Anthropomorphism features 
prominently in many stories and these form a major part 
of the literary and oral heritage of many different 
cultures, particularly myths, legends and folk tales, from 
Aesop, to Orwell and Disney. It is endemic in many 
cultures, expressing human relationships with nature 
and with reality.  
 
In an obituary in The Guardian newspaper the British 
comic actor Peter Bayliss is described by Peter Barnes as 
an original and an eccentric: 
There was a time when he went 
everywhere with an invisible dog. He 
could throw his voice slightly and his 
barking was uncannily accurate. Legend 
has it he took the 'dog' with him to 
Fortnum and Mason's tea room to 
negotiate a contract with Cameron 
Mackintosh ….He asked the waitress for 
a saucer of water for his dog, and 
included the canine in negotiations. 
Every time Mackintosh suggested a 
salary the dog would bark. Bayliss would 
say: "My dog doesn't think that's 
enough". He came away with a lucrative 




The dialogue that is possible because of the presence of 
Bayliss’s invisible dog creates at least two planes for 
philosophical thinking. Firstly, it reveals the ambiguity of 
the power positions between the actor and the agent 
and shows us something of the paradoxical nature of 
power itself. Secondly, the invention motivates us as 




spectators. It stimulates the curiosity that might be 
absent if the parties were to negotiate more 
conventionally. It helps us to question the appearance of 
things. 
 
Gaita (2004) draws on his contemplation of the 
relationship between humans and animals to explore 
what it means to be fully human and to track the 
foundations of ethical thought.  He argues that this 
understanding is often shaped by stories and that it is an 
error to assume that the cognitive content of such 
stories has to be extracted from its story-telling form, as 
science and philosophy are wont to do, in order to arrive 
at its factual or conceptual value. The literary or artistic 
forms of such stories are critical to the sphere of human 
meaning to which they relate. Gaita suggests almost 
everything important in human life occurs in the realm 
of meaning. He reminds readers: 
Think how often literature and art 
more generally give us reason to say 
that we have come to see meaning 
where we had not before, or deeper 
meaning than we had thought 
possible, or even sometimes sense 
where we had not seen it. These are 
ways of seeing that are 
characteristic of the realm of 
meaning   (2004:105) 
Gaita suggests that the realm of meaning is of human 
origin and a ‘gift of culture’ (2004:197). Gaita’s many 
reflections on his own and other people’s dogs and 
other animals draw out distinctions between the 
psychological and moral dimensions, between what is 
necessary and what is possible, in human relationships 
with animals. He argues that it is in this realm of 
meaning, rather than in the nature of things or in the 
fabric of the universe, that our ethical thought is 
embedded. He acknowledges the susceptibility of this 
interpretative faculty to emotional indulgence and 
warns: 
The realm of meaning in which form 
cannot be separated from content is 
essentially rather than accidentally 
vulnerable to sentimentality. We can 
dream of overcoming sentimentality, 
pathos and banality, but we cannot 
dream of…a realm of meaning in 
which we are not vulnerable to these 
failings.   (Gaita, 2004:102) 
 
Conclusion 
Gaita’s comments on ethical thought in the realm of 
meaning point to the depth and significance of dialogue 
that become possible when story, experience and 
philosophising are creatively interwoven. I believe this 
has a number of implications for dialogue in the 
university. 
Firstly, by relating stories from my experience of P4C, 
this reflective paper has conveyed a sense of the 
playfulness, freedom and richness available when 
‘teaching material’ is philosophically inviting, the 
process of dialogue participatory and open-ended and 
the intentions of educators genuinely exploratory. 
Dialogue seekers need to be prepared for the 
unexpected, and to embrace a variety of sources of 
contribution to the dialogue. Sources that have a role in 
questioning the appearance of things, and therefore 
acting as contributors to creative and critical thinking 
and dialogue, can include intermediate areas of 
experience or transitional phenomena, metaphorical, 
poetic, fictional and anecdotal material.  Experimenting 
with this pedagogy and listening to young children 
engaging in philosophical dialogue, during a time of felt 
limitations in the given curriculum of both schools and 
teacher education, offered an open space in which to 
consider alternatives, within the dialogues themselves, 
but also as a line of flight from curricular and 
pedagogical constraint.  
Secondly the interplay between the dialogues with 
children and my university based work with trainees and 
with teachers, has prompted deep-seated questions 
regarding different purposes of dialogue and the 




respective roles of teachers/adults and children within 
them. Critical incidents appear to prompt useful 
dialogues among practitioners about knowledge claims 
and the ethics of classroom practice. This creative use of 
episodes of experience sheds a new light on the 
instructive worth of ‘anecdotal’ material in professional 
training, often discouraged as a source of illumination. 
Finally, the community of enquiry pedagogy is one well 
worth trying in the university, to enable tutors and 
students to explore streams of meaning and get at 
fundamental questions of belief and value in their 
subject areas, and as a powerful way of developing 
critical and creative thinking skills. It could be 
transforming of academics’ dialogues with one another. 
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